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 I INTRODUCTION 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination in the employment 
context.1 The statute protects employees against various forms of discrimination ranging from  as 
work assignments to discriminatory termination and unequal pay.2  Title VII was amended by the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, to expand remedies for intentional discrimination and unlawful 
harassment in the workplace.3 But from its beginning it core prohibition declared that  “it shall be 
an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or discharge any 
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individuals race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin[.]”4   
In interpreting Title VII, the Supreme Court held that harassment leading to noneconomic 
injury can violate the statute. In Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, the Supreme Court held that 
such harassment  can violate Title VII as long as the sexual harassment  is  sufficiently severe or 
pervasive “to alter the conditions of [the victims] employment and create an abusive working 
environment.5”  The Court reaffirmed this holding in Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., where the Court 
reiterated that, when a workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule and 
insults that are sufficiently severe or pervasive, Title VII is violated.6 
                                                          
1 HAROLD S. LEWIS, JR. & ELIZABETH J. NORMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW AND PRACTICE 42    
(2d ed. 2001). 
2 Id. at 43-44. 
3 Id. at  45. 
4 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2 (Date). 
5 See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (quoting). 
6 See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). 
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Despite these holdings, judges have had much trouble adjudicating these cases and 
applying the correct standard.7  For example, The Third Circuit has applied inconsistent variations 
of the severe or pervasive standard such as “pervasive and regular,” “severe and pervasive,”  (even 
though that court also spoke of “severe or pervasive standard” in the same opinion).8  In 
Castleberry v. STI Group, the Third Circuit acknowledged this confusion and confirmed that the 
“severe or pervasive” standard was correct.9  In that case, the court recognized that under the 
correct standard it is possible for one isolated incident to be enough to establish a hostile work 
environment.10  While courts do hint at which context would allow for an isolated incident to be 
sufficient, courts lack the capacity to consistently determine when an incident is sufficiently severe 
or pervasive  to amount to a change in the terms and conditions of employment.  
First, this Note will provide a brief history of the severe or pervasive standard.  Next, it 
will discuss how courts like the Third Circuit have misapplied the severe or pervasive standard. 
Subsequently, the note will demonstrate how judges are poor arbiters of severity and pervasiveness 
in the hostile work environment context. Lastly, the Note will discuss the implications of these 
decisions and ultimately argue that judges should be more disposed to allow these hostile work 
environment claims to be decided by juries, which are better equipped to determine when 
harassment is so severe or pervasive to warrant a hostile work environment claim. 
                                                          
7 See Castleberry v. STI Group, 863 F.3d 259, 264- 65 (2017). 
8 Id;see Mandel v. M & Q Packaging Corp., 706 F.3d 157, 167 (3rd Cir. 2013)(stating that to succeed on a 
hostile work environment claim the plaintiff must establish that the discrimination was severe or pervasive); 
Andreoli v. Gates, 482 F.3d 641, 644 (3rd Cir. 2007)(stating that in order to state a claim under Title VII for hostile 
work environment, the employee must show the discrimination was pervasive and regular); Hare v. Potter, 220 Fed. 
Appx. 120, 132 (stating that plaintiffs claim may not be demonstrative of harassment that is severe and pervasive); 
Weston v. Pennsylvania, 251 F.3d 420, 426 (3rd Cir. 2001)( stating the standard to apply is pervasive and regular 
but then applied the severe or pervasive standard).    
9  Castleberry v. STI Group, 863 F.3d 259, 264- 65 (2017). 
10Id.  
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 II BACKGROUND 
A. History of the Supreme Court and the Severe or Pervasive Standard. 
 In Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, The Supreme Court declared for the first time that a 
hostile work environment case may violate Title VII, holding that to do so the harassment must be 
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive work 
environment.11  In Meritor, plaintiff, Mechelle Vinson, an employee at Meritor Savings Bank, was 
discharged for excessive use of sick leave.12 Vinson brought an action against Taylor, Vice 
President at Meritor Savings Bank, and the bank, contending that she was consistently subjected 
to sexual harassment by Taylor during her four years of employment in violation of Title VII.13  
Vinson alleged that Taylor repeatedly made demands for sexual favors, fondled her in front of 
employees, followed her into the restroom when she was alone, exposed himself to her, and even 
tried to forcibly rape her on multiple occasions.14 Taylor denied all of the allegations and stated 
that they were merely a response to a business-related dispute.15 The District Court denied relief 
and instead found that, if both parties did have an intimate or sexual relationship, it was voluntary 
and had nothing to do with plaintiff’s continued employment.16 Therefore, the District Court 
concluded that Vinson did not prove a Title VII violation, because the bank was without notice of 
the harassment.17 Subsequently, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed stating 
that a violation of Title VII can be predicated on two types of sexual harassment: (1) harassment 
which involves condition concrete employment benefits on the employee providing  sexual favors; 
                                                          
11 See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67.  
12 Id. at 60. 
13 Id.  
14 Id.   
15 Id. at 61. 
16 See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 61. 
17 Id. at 62. 
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and (2) harassment that does not affect economic benefits, but creates a hostile work 
environment.18 The Court of Appeals believed that Vinson’s claim clearly fit the second 
category.19 The Supreme Court agreed and held that sexual advances that create a hostile work 
environment are prohibited under Title VII.20 
First, looking to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) guidelines, 
the Court stated, that Title VII is not limited to “‘economic’ or ‘tangible’ discrimination” and that 
sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination  prohibited by Title VII.21  Quoting the Fifth 
Circuit’s decision in Rogers v. EEOC, the Court stated:  
[T]he phrase “terms, conditions or privileges of employment” in [Title VII] is an expansive 
concept which sweeps within its protective ambit the practice of creating a working 
environment heavily charged with ethnic or racial discrimination . . . . One can readily 
envision working environments so heavily polluted with discrimination as to destroy 
completely the emotional and psychological stability of minority group workers.22 
The Court then declared that a plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII by 
establishing sex based discrimination created a hostile work environment.23  Despite this holding, 
the Court acknowledged that not all sex-related conduct constitutes a violation of Title VII.24 The 
Court declared that, for a harassment claim to be actionable under Title VII, “it must be sufficiently 
severe or pervasive ‘to alter the conditions of [the victim’s] employment and create an abusive 
working environment.’”25 
                                                          
18 Id. at 62. 
19 Id.  
20 Id. at 66. 
21 Id. at 64. 
22 Id. at 65-66. 
23 See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66. 
24 Id. at 67. 
25 Id. 
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In Harris v. Forklift Systems, the Supreme Court expounded on its definition of a 
discriminatorily hostile work environment under Title VII.26  In Harris, Teresa Harris, a manager 
at Forklift Systems, was found to have been subjected to gender-based insults and unwanted sexual 
innuendos.27  Specifically, Hardy, Forklift’s Systems President, on several occasions said to Harris 
in the presence of other employees that “‘you’re a woman, what do you know’ and ‘We need a 
man as the rental manager’; at least once, he told her she was a ‘dumb ass woman.’”28  
Additionally, Hardy also suggested that the two of them go to a hotel to negotiate Harris’ raise.29  
Harris complained to Hardy about his conduct and was assured that he would stop this behavior.30  
Despite her complaints, the verbal harassment continued until she quit the job.31  Harris then sued 
under Title VII alleging that Hardy’s conduct created a hostile work environment because of her 
gender.32   
The District Court held that Hardy’s conduct did not create an abusive environment.33  It 
held that, while Hardy’s comments would offend a reasonable woman, they were not: 
[S]o severe as to be expected to seriously affect [Harris’] psychological well-being…. [H]is 
conduct would not have risen to the level of interfering with that person’s work 
performance. Neither do I believe that [Harris] was subjectively so offended that she 
suffered injury . . . . Although Hardy may at times have genuinely offended [Harris], I do 
not believe that he created a working environment so poisoned as to be intimidating or 
abusive to [Harris].34 
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.35   
                                                          
26 See Harris v. Forklift Systems, 510 U.S. 17 (1993). 
27 Id. at 19 
28 Id.  
29 Id.  
30 Id. 
31 See Harris, 510 U.S. at 19. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 19-20. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 20.  
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether a hostile work environment claim 
requires that the conduct affect the psychological well-being of the plaintiff.36 The Court held that 
a hostile work environment claim brought under Title VII is not limited to conduct that is 
psychologically injurious to a reasonable person’s well-being.37  The Court, looking to its decision 
in Meritor, stated that conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile 
work environment is beyond the scope of Title VII.38  Additionally, if the victim does not 
subjectively believe the environment to be abusive, the conduct has not altered the conditions of 
their employment resulting in no Title VII violation.39  Thus, the Harris Court created both a 
subjective and objective component to establishing a hostile work environment claim.40  The Court 
further noted that there is no “mathematically precise test” in determining whether a work 
environment is sufficiently hostile.41 Instead, this determination can be made only by looking at 
circumstances such as: (1) the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; (2) its severity; (3) whether 
it is physically threatening or humiliating or a mere offensive utterance; and (4) whether the 
conduct unreasonably interferes with the employees work performance.42  While the Court noted 
that these relevant factors should be taken into account, it made clear that no single factor is 
required.43   
 Finally, in Oncale v. Sundower Offshore Services, Inc., the Supreme Court found that in 
judging the real social impact of workplace behavior, fact finders cannot solely rely on the words 
                                                          
36 See Harris, 510 U.S. at 20. 
37 Id. at 22. 
38 Id. at 21. 
39 Id.  
40 Id.  
41 See Harris, 510 U.S. at 20. 
42 Id. at 23. 
43 Id.  
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used or the acts performed but instead must look at the totality of the circumstances.44  Joseph 
Oncale, a roustabout on an eight man crew working on an oil platform, alleged that he quit his job 
because during his employment he was harassed because of his sex.45  Specifically, Oncale alleged 
that on various occasions he was subjected to humiliating sex-related actions by his coworkers in 
the presence of the rest of his crew and was also physically assaulted in a sexual manner by his 
coworkers.46  Oncale contended that his complaints to supervisory personnel were fruitless and 
eventually quit, asking that his pink slip reflect that his voluntary termination was caused by the 
sexual harassment he suffered at the hands of his coworkers.47  Oncale subsequently filed a 
complaint stating that he was discriminated against because of his sex.48   
The District Court held that “‘Mr. Oncale has no cause of action under Title VII for 
harassment by male co-workers.’”49 In other words, the court held, relying on Fifth Circuit 
precedent, that Oncale had no claim because that person could not discriminate based on sex 
against their own gender.50  The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, relying on the same precedent, 
affirmed the district court’s decision.51  
The Supreme Court disagreed with the lower courts’ holdings, providing examples where 
same-sex harassment could lead to an inference of discrimination based on sex.52 The Court stated 
that harassing conduct does not have to be motivated by sexual desire to create an inference of sex 
discrimination for the fact finder.53 The Court explained that a trier of may find that sex 
                                                          
44 See Oncale v. Sundower Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81-82 ( 1998). 
45 Id.  
46 Id.  
47 Id.  
48 Id.  
49 See Oncale,  523 U.S. at 77. 
50 Id.  
51 Id.  
52 Id. at 80. 
53 Id.  
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discrimination exists when a female victim is harassed by another woman using  sex-specific and 
derogatory terms derived from a general hostility to women in the workplace. The Court also 
explained that a plaintiff who alleges same-sex harassment may also offer direct comparative 
evidence about how the alleged harasser treated members of both sexes differently in the 
workplace. The Court emphasized that the fact finder must consider all of the circumstances when 
judging the objective severity of the harassment.54  The Court stated: 
A professional football player’s working environment is not severely or pervasively 
abusive, for example, if the coach smacks him on the buttocks as he heads onto the field-
even if the same behavior would reasonably be experienced as abusive by the coach’s 
secretary (male or female) back at the office. The real social impact of workplace behavior 
often depends on a constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and 
relationships which are not fully captured by a simple recitation of the words used or 
physical acts performed. Common sense, and an appropriate sensitivity to social context, 
will enable courts and juries to distinguish between simple teasing or roughhousing among 
members of [of a class], and conduct which a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position 
would find severely hostile or abusive.55 
Despite these instruction on considering the totality of the circumstances, the cases below illustrate 
judges’ inability to do so.  
B. The Third Circuit’s Clarification of the Severe or Pervasive Standard and its likely 
implications.  
The Supreme Court has determined that, to violate the statute, conduct must be sufficiently 
severe or pervasive to alter one’s employment.56 Nonetheless, the Third Circuit has incorrectly 
used many variations of the Supreme Court’s severe or pervasive standard: (1) pervasive and 
                                                          
54 Id. at 81-82. 
55 See Oncale,  523 U.S. at 77. 
56 See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 22. 
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regular;57 (2) severe and pervasive;58 (3) pervasive and regular (even though that court also spoke 
of “severe or pervasive standard” in the same opinion).59 Despite the similarity in the phrasing 
Castleberry v. STI Group., acknowledged that the different standards lead to different results.60  
 In Castleberry, the plaintiffs, two African American males, were hired as general laborers 
by STI Group.61 The plaintiffs alleged that on several occasions an anonymous person wrote 
insulting racial comments on the company sign-in sheets and that they were often  permitted only 
to clean around the pipelines instead of working on them (despite having more pipeline experience 
then their non-African American counterparts).62 Moreover, plaintiffs alleged that a supervisor 
told the plaintiffs that “if they had ‘nigger-rigged’ the fence, they would be fired.”63 Plaintiffs 
contended that, after they reported the offensive conduct, they were fired without any 
explanation.64  
Plaintiffs brought a harassment suit in the District Court against STI but their claims were 
dismissed for failure to state a claim, because the alleged harassment was not sufficiently 
“pervasive and regular.”65 Although the District Court may have been relying on prior Third 
Circuit precedent in using this standard,66 the Third Circuit clarified that the proper standard was 
                                                          
57 See Ocasio v. Lehigh Valley Family Health Ctr., 92 Fed.Appx 876 (3d Cir. 2004)(finding that  
 to establish a prima facie case for employment discrimination due to a hostile work environment the 
 discrimination must be pervasive and regular.); see also Andreoli v. Gates 482 F.3d 641, 643 (3d. Cir. 
 2007); Cardenas v. Massey 269 F.3d 251, 260 (3d Cir 2001). 
58 See Hare v. Potter 220 Fed. Appx. 120, 131-32 (3d Cir. 2012) ( finding that appellants claims may not    
 have risen to the level of harassment that is “severe and pervasive”). 
59 See Weston v. Pennsylvania, 251 F.3d 420, 426 (3d Cir 2001) ( stating that  that the discrimination must 
be severe or pervasive establish a hostile work environment claim but then applying the pervasive or 
regular standard in evaluating the claim.).  
60 See Castleberry, 863 F.3d at 264- 65. 
61 Id. at 262 
62 Id.  
63 Id.  
64 Id.  
65 See Castleberry, 863 F.3d at 262  
66 Id. 
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the “severe or pervasive” test, which had been adopted by the Supreme Court in Harris.67 Thus, to 
establish a hostile work environment claim in the Third Circuit, a plaintiff mush show:  
1) The employee suffered intentional discrimination because of his/her [race], 2) the 
discrimination was severe or pervasive, 3) the discrimination detrimentally affected the 
plaintiff, 4) the discrimination would detrimentally affect a reasonable person in like 
circumstances, and 5) the existence of respondeat superior liability [meaning the employer 
is responsible].68  
Under this standard, the Third Circuit noted that one isolated incident, if severe enough, could 
establish a hostile work environment claim.69 Specifically, the Third Circuit stated:  
Indeed the distinction means that severity and pervasiveness are alternative possibilities: 
some harassment may be severe enough to contaminate an environment even if not 
pervasive; other less objectionable, conduct will contaminate the workplace only if it is 
pervasive.70 Whether an environment is hostile requires looking at the totality of the 
circumstances, including: the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; 
whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and 
whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance71….The 
Supreme Court’s decision to adopt the severe or pervasive standard -- thereby abandoning 
the regular requirement -- lends support that an isolated incident of discrimination(if 
severe) can suffice to state a claim for harassment.72 
After deciding on the correct standard and its implications, the Third Circuit addressed 
plaintiffs’ allegations.73 It decided that plaintiffs’ allegations of their supervisor’s use of the 
racially charged slur in front of them and their non-African American workers in conjunction with 
the use of the racial slur which was accompanied by threats of termination was sufficiently severe 
to create a hostile work environment.74 Additionally, the Third Circuit noted that plaintiffs’ 
allegations also satisfied the pervasive alternative because their supervisor made the derogatory 
comments, on several occasions their sign in sheets had racially discriminatory comments; and  
                                                          
67 Id. at 264. 
68 Id. at 263. 
69 Id. at 264. 
70 See Castleberry, 863 F.3d at 264 (citing Jensen v. Potter, 435 F.3d 444, (3d. Cir. 2006)). 
71 See Castleberry, 863 F.3d at 264 (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 23). 
72 See Castleberry, 863 F.3d at 265. 
73 Id. at 265-66. 
74 Id. at 265. 
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they were required to do menial tasks while their less experienced white colleagues were delegated 
more complex tasks.75 Thus, the Third Circuit declared that plaintiffs alleged the necessary 
elements of a hostile workplace environment claim and should not have been dismissed at the 
12(b)(6) stage.76  
 Although it is important that Third Circuit noted that one isolated incident can be sufficient 
in establishing a hostile work environment claim,77 it was not the first circuit to come to this 
conclusion.78 Other circuits have adopted a similar approach. For example, Boyer-Liberto v. 
Fountainebleu Corp., the Fourth Circuit found that the use of the phrase “porch monkey” to an 
African American worker was severe enough to by itself create a hostile work environment.79 In 
that case, the plaintiff, a cocktail waitress at the Clarion Resort Fontainebleau Hotel, alleged that 
she was called a “porch monkey” twice within a twenty-four-hour period by a white coworker and 
was subsequently fired shortly after she complained to the company’s human resources director.80 
Plaintiff filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland asserting 
a Title VII hostile work environment claim against the employer.81 The District Court, relying on 
a prior Fourth Circuit precedent,82 awarded the defendants summary judgement because  the 
“[coworkers] conduct was not so severe or pervasive as to create a hostile work environment.”83 
                                                          
75 Id. at 265-266. 
76 See Castleberry, 863 F.3d at 268. 
77 Max Mitchell, Potential Litigation Uptick Seen From 3rd Circuit’s Workplace Slur Ruling, The Legal 
Intellgencer, http://www.law.com/thelegalintelligencer/sites/thelegalintelligencer/2017/07/31/potential -
litigation-uptick-seen-from-3rd-circuits-workplace-slur-ruling/?back=law. 
78 See Boyer- Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264,268 (4th Cir. 2015) (finding that an “isolated 
incident of harassment, if extremely serious, can create a hostile work environment.); Adams v. Austal, 
U.S.A., LLC, 754 F.3d 1240, 1254 (11th Cir. 2014) (finding that “although his carving was an isolated 
act, it was severe. A reasonable jury could find that Williams’s work environment was objectively 
hostile.); Ayissi-Etoh v. Fannie Mae, 712 F.3d 573, 577 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (acknowledging that that the 
use of the n-word by a supervisor might have been sufficient to establish a hostile work environment.). 
79 See Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 280 (4th Cir. 2015). 
80 Id. at 269-270. 
81 Id. at 271. 
82 Jordan v. Alternative Resources Corp., 458 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2006). 
83  See Liberto 786 F.3d at 274. 
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The Fourth Circuit expressly abrogated the prior decision the lower court had relied on84 and 
reversed the summary judgment:85 It stated that “a reasonable jury could find that [the coworker’s] 
two uses of the porch monkey epithet – whether viewed as a single incident or as a pair of discrete 
instances of harassment- were severe enough to engender a hostile work environment.”86 
These Third and Fourth Circuit decisions appreciate the power of one isolated incident to 
poison the workplace, but others seem to be more concerned about the implications of these 
decisions. For example, Judge Paul Niemeyer’s dissent in Liberto predicted that the “holding will 
generate widespread litigation over the many offensive workplace comments made every day that 
employees find to be humiliating.”87 Although others respond  that these cases  largely just clarify 
the Supreme Court’s prior decisions,88 the implications of cases like Castleberry for plaintiffs are 
significant. Specifically, the Castleberry decision may make it more likely that harassment claims  
will survive a motion to dismiss;89 however, they may have incidentally increased the chances of 
a plaintiff’s claim to be dismissed at summary judgment.  
C. The Use of Summary Judgment in Hostile Work Environment Claims   
a. Background on Summary Judgement 
                                                          
84 Id. at 284. 
85 Id. at 280-281. 
86 Id. at 280. 
87 Id. at 304. 
88 Max Mitchell, Potential Litigation Uptick Seen From 3rd Circuit’s Workplace Slur Ruling, The Legal 
Intellgencer, http://www.law.com/thelegalintelligencer/sites/thelegalintelligencer/2017/07/31/potential-
litigation-uptick-seen-from-3rd-circuits-workplace-slur-ruling/?back=law 




With the likely uptick in hostile work environment claims stemming from Castleberry,90 
summary judgment may be more important as a tool judges may utilize (whether appropriately or 
inappropriately) to dispose of these hostile work environment claims. According to Rule 56 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “court[s] shall grant summary judgement if the movant shows 
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitle to judgment as a 
matter of law.”91 In 1986 the Supreme Court decided three cases - Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 
Inc.,92 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,93 and Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,94 
which provided clarity on the burdens associated with the use of summary judgment. Prior to 1986, 
when these three cases were decided, many questioned whether the use of summary judgement 
actually served its purpose which is to “weed out” insufficient claims prior to trial.95  
In the wake of these decisions,  the three cases have become the cornerstone of modern 
summary judgment practice.96 The first inquiry in determining whether summary judgement is 
appropriate is to determine which facts are material.97 The materiality of the facts changes based 
on what the substantive law requires and only disputes over the facts which affect the outcome of 
the suit will preclude the entry of summary judgment.98 In other words, summary judgment should 
not be granted if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.99 “If the 
                                                          
90 Max Mitchell, Potential Litigation Uptick Seen From 3rd Circuit’s Workplace Slur Ruling, The Legal 
Intellgencer, http://www.law.com/thelegalintelligencer/sites/thelegalintelligencer/2017/07/31/potential -
litigation-uptick-seen-from-3rd-circuits-workplace-slur-ruling/?back=law 
91 Fed.R. Civ. P. 56(a).  
92 See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986). 
93 See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). 
94 See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., LTD. v. Zennith Radio Corp. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).  
95 STEVEN S. GENSLER, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules and Commentary Rule 56 (Feb. 2017 
Update). 
96 STEVEN S. GENSLER, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules and Commentary Rule 56 (Feb. 2017 
Update). 
97 See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-248. 
98 Id. at 248. 
99 Id.  
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undisputed facts support a legal ruling on a dispositive issue, then “all other facts are 
immaterial.”100 The moving party always has the burden of proving that there is no genuine issue 
of material fact. When the moving party has met its burden, the non-moving party to defeat the 
motion must establish that it can adduce sufficient  evidence for the trier of fact to find in its favor 
under the relevant standard of proof. . “As the Supreme Court has famously extolled, ‘summary 
judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored shortcut, but rather as an integral part 
of the Federal Rules as a whole.”101 However, while summary judgment may be an essential tool 
for courts, judges do not always utilize the proper amount of “caution” that is necessary in deciding 
when summary judgment is proper.  
b. Summary Judgment in Hostile Work Environment Cases 
Studies have shown that more than seventy percent of defendants’ summary judgment 
motions in employment cases are granted.102 Courts frequently dismiss plaintiff’s hostile work 
environment claims based on their “failure” to adduce sufficient evidence to satisfy one or more 
of the elements. Specifically, courts often find that plaintiffs fail to satisfy the severe or pervasive 
elements of a hostile work environment claim.103  
While one isolated incident may be enough to establish a hostile work environment 
claim,104 courts often have demonstrated extreme difficulties in determining whether a verbal or 
physical act should be characterized as being sufficiently severe or pervasive. Since the inquiry as 
to whether an incident(s) is sufficiently severe or pervasive is very fact sensitive, courts often find 
                                                          
100 Celotex 323 
101 STEVEN S. GENSLER, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules and Commentary Rule 56 (Feb. 2017 
Update). 
102 Judge Nancy Gertner & Melissa Hart, Employment Law Implicit Bias in Employment Litigation 80 in 
Implicit Racial Bias Across the Law (Justin D. Levinson & Robert J. Smith eds., 2012)  
103 Theresa M. Beiner, The Misuse of Summary Judgement, 34 Wake Forest L. Rev. (1999).  
104 See e.g. Castleberry, 863 F.3d at 264. 
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themselves balancing the facts rather than staying true to their role in the summary judgment 
process, which is to determine whether or not there is actually a genuine issue for trial. The cases 
below demonstrate this point. 
In Ayissi-Etoh v. Fannie Mae, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit, reversed the grant of summary judgement on plaintiff’s hostile work 
environment claim.105 The ultimate result, therefore, was favorable to the plaintiff, but the district 
court’s determination illustrates the problem. Plaintiff, an African-American, alleged that, after 
working at Fannie Mae for about three months, he received a promotion.106 However, he did not 
receive the same pay increase as others similarly situated.107 Plaintiff alleged that soon after he 
stepped into his new role, he and his manager began arguing on a regular basis due to the fact that 
he was still doing staff level work despite his promotion.108 Concerned about receiving negative 
reviews and his lack of a raise, the plaintiff met with Jaqueline Wagner, the Chief Audit Executive, 
on several occasions.109 The plaintiff alleged that, when he asked why he had not received a raise, 
Wagner, a white male, responded “for a young black man smart like you, we are happy to have 
your expertise; I think I’m already paying you a lot of money.”110 Subsequently, plaintiff met with 
Fannie Mae’s Vice President of Internal Audit, Thomas Cooper, to discuss the fact that he was still 
receiving staff level assignments. The meeting allegedly quickly became heated and ended with 
Thomas Cooper yelling “Get out of my office nigger.”111 The District Court held that: 
it is clear that defendants are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s hostile work 
environment claim. As distasteful as Cooper’s use of a racial epithet to address plaintiff is, 
no reasonable jury could find a hostile work environment claim based on that single 
                                                          
105 See Ayissi-Etoh v. Fannie Mae, 712 F.3d 572, 574 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
106 Id. at 574 
107 Id.  
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 575. 
110 See Ayissi-Etoh, 712 F.3d at 575. 
111 Id. at 575. 
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utterance- even taking into consideration the fact that Cooper was plaintiff’s superior and 
the fact that the epithet was directly addressed to plaintiff.112 
 
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed stating that a reasonable jury could find 
that plaintiff Cooper and Wagner’s behavior was severe or pervasive enough to create a hostile 
work environment.113 The court acknowledged that the use of deeply offensive racial epithet 
targeted at plaintiff may alone have been sufficient to establish a hostile work environment.114 
Additionally, the D.C. Circuit also found that Wagner’s “young black man” comment was also 
sufficient to support plaintiffs claim.115 Despite the happy outcome for plaintiff,116 it is obviously 
problematic that the District Court thought that it was “clear” that defendants were entitled to 
summary judgment because plaintiff’s proof could not be found by a jury to be sufficiently  severe 
or pervasive  to establish a hostile work environment.117  
 In Adams v. Austal, the Eleventh Circuit also reviewed a District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment on a hostile work environment claim.118 In that case, twenty-four African-American 
current and former employees filed complaints of racial discrimination against Austal, U.S.A. 
L.L.C.119 The employees alleged that vulgar racial graffiti frequently appeared in the men’s 
bathroom.120 The graffiti included phrases such as “How do you starve a nigger to death? Hide his 
food stamp card in his work boots[.]”121 Additionally, several of the employees also saw or heard 
about nooses found in the break room.122 The employees also complained about their coworkers 
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referring to them or another African-American employee as “boy” or “monkey.”123 The District 
Court granted summary judgements against the claims of thirteen of the employees stating that “a 
reasonable jury could not find that the harassing conduct was frequent and severe.”124 In arriving 
at this decision,  the District Court evaluated each claim of a hostile work environment based on 
the “‘the specificity and quantity of evidence presented by each plaintiff.’”125 
The Eleventh Circuit held that seven of the employees had presented sufficient evidence to 
establish a hostile work environment claim but affirmed the summary judgements against the 
remaining six employees.126 In regard to plaintiff, Tesha Hollis, the Eleventh Circuit found that 
the record presents a genuine dispute of material fact that Hollis’ work environment was 
objectively hostile.127 Hollis offered proof  that, in the three years she worked at Austal, she was 
subjected to various forms of severe harassment:128 1) she discovered a noose in the breakroom 
and another noose that someone hung on one of the ships; 2)  her supervisor pretended to 
masturbate in her presence while telling her about a racist perverse drawing in the men’s room 
which stated “yall got a bad ass nigger bitch working over here….[A] white man like me would 
like to split that dark oak”; 3)  she heard white employees, most of whom were supervisors, call 
black employees “boy” on “many” occasions; 4) she heard someone say over the walky-talky 
system, “[S]end some monkeys over here.”; 5) she observed a white employee who called black 
employees “boy” and “monkey,” kick a black employee, and 6) every morning she saw white 
employees on her crew wearing clothing with the confederate flag on it.129 The Eleventh Circuit 
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found that Hollis’ harassment was frequent, severe and humiliating and thus, found that a 
“reasonable jury could find that her workplace was objectively hostile.”130 
 Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit also found that the record presented a genuine dispute of 
material facts as to whether plaintiff, Frederick Williams’s work environment was objectively 
hostile.131 Williams alleged that he: 1) saw one coworker wear a confederate flag; 2) saw racist 
graffiti in the men’s room regularly; 3) reported the graffiti to his supervisor only to be told “it’s 
always been like that and if [he] didn’t like it [he] could quit[,]”; and 4) witnessed his supervisor 
carve the word porch monkey in the aluminum of the ship.132 The Eleventh Circuit found that 
although his supervisor’s carving was an “isolated act,” it was severe.133   
 In these cases, there were a collection of acts, which might have been found pervasive even 
if not severe, although the court viewed some, like the carving, as severe.  However, in regard to 
another plaintiff, Robert Adams, the Eleventh Circuit found that the record failed to establish a 
disputed issue in relation to his work environment.134 Adams alleged that in his two years working 
for Austul he: 1) saw coworkers wear the confederate flag on frequent basis; 2) heard people say 
the slur “nigger,” a “few times” over two years; 3) heard about the noose in the break room; and 
4) frequently saw the racist graffiti in the men’s restroom.135 The Eleventh Circuit found that, 
although Adams saw the racist graffiti and frequently saw the confederate flag, Austal regularly 
cleared the graffiti and his exposure to the Confederate flag was not threatening.136 The Eleventh 
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Circuit also explained that, because Adams heard the slur “nigger” only a few times over several 
years, it did not create a genuine issue of material fact.137 
 While it may seem extremely surprising that a District Court would grant summary 
judgment on Tesha Harris’ claims, what is even more surprising is that the Eleventh Circuit was 
willing to recognize that an isolated incident can be severe enough to establish a claim but not 
ready to acknowledge that hearing one’s coworkers utter derogatory racial slurs was sufficiently 
severe. This is especially true given the fact that other courts have recognized that the n-word goes 
a long way in making a work environment hostile. Indeed, even if a reasonable juror may decide 
that the occasional use of that word may not be severe, it would be hard to imagine, looking at the 
totality of the circumstances, that a juryt would not also find that the incidents which Adams 
experienced were not adequately pervasive.  
 In Cooler v. Layne Christensen Co., the Eleventh Circuit was again tasked with 
determining whether a plaintiff pled enough to create a genuine issue on a hostile work 
environment claim.138 In that case, Cooler, an African American driller helper at Layne’s 
Pensacola, described various events in which he was subjected to racial harassment.139 Cooler 
alleged: 1) when he complained about overheating and cramps, his supervisor instructed him to 
cool down in a toolshed (a hot metal container) instead of the air conditioned car in which the 
supervisor and another white male sat;140 2) that Alpo Joiner, a white male who was Cooler’s 
supervisor at another project site, would often refer to Cooler as “you people” or “boy”;141 3) that 
his white supervisors used the n-word while talking to him to see how he would react to their use 
                                                          
137 Id. at 1254. 
138 See Cooler v. Layne Christensen Co., No. 16-17773, 2017 WL 4512159, at *1 (11th Cir. 2017).   
139 Id. at 1. 
140 Id. 
141 Id.  
 21 
of the word;142 4) Cooler alleged that he was delegated tasks by a person known as the “grand 
wizard” of the warehouse who refused to speak with him directly but instead would only tell a 
white person what Cooler should do while in his presence;143 5) he was told that he was not 
welcome in the breakroom;144 6) when he complained to other supervisors about the inappropriate 
conduct nothing was done about it;145 7) he was subject to inappropriate comments about his hair, 
which was long and braided;146 8) he was given more degrading assignments than his white 
coworkers; and 9)  he was mistreated because of his relationship with a white woman and  was 
subjected to various other forms of harassment.147 
The District Court found that Cooler failed to allege that his harassment was severe or 
pervasive enough to alter the conditions of his employment.148 The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged 
that its prior decisions state that “in isolation, the use of a racial epithet on one occasion is not 
enough evidence of severe or pervasive harassment to make a hostile work environment claim.”149 
The court then explained its decision in Adams as creating a distinction between using slurs like 
the word “nigger” to humiliate a plaintiff and use of the word in ways that were not threatening or 
demeaning.150 The Eleventh Circuit found that because the supervisors used the word as a means 
of getting a reaction out of Cooler, “a reasonable person could perceive their intent was to 
humiliate Cooler.”151 The court also noted that, while the use of the term boy in referring to a black 
man “is not always evidence of racial animus,” it is important to look at the context in which the 
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word is used.152 The Eleventh Circuit held that the plaintiff failed to acknowledge the context in 
which the word boy was used given that the one referring to Cooler as “boy” was the one people 
referred to as the “grand wizard.”153 The court held that, given the totality of the circumstances, 
Cooler created a genuine dispute of material fact and thus, reversed the District Courts summary 
judgment on the hostile work environment claim.154 
While the Eleventh Circuit seems to have set a pretty high bar when it comes to establishing 
a hostile work environment claim, other circuits have been more willing to find a genuine dispute 
of material fact on the issue. In Zetwick v. County of Yolo, the Ninth Circuit found that a plaintiff 
who was subjected to unwelcome hugs adduced enough evidence to create a claim for a hostile 
work environment.155 Victoria Zetwick, a Yolo County sergeant, alleged that from 1999 to 2012 
defendant, the county sheriff, subjected her to “numerous hugs and at least one unwelcome kiss 
that, taken as a whole, created a sexually hostile work environment.”156 Zetwick contended that 
between 2003 and 2011 defendant hugged her at least 100 times.157 While defendant contended 
that he hugged Zetwick only during public outings158, Zetwick alleged that defendant had a 
tendency to hug only females and give males only handshakes.159 In response to these allegations, 
defendants argued that his conduct was “not objectively severe or pervasive enough to establish a 
hostile work environment, but merely an innocuous, socially acceptable conduct.”160 The District 
Court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment.161 The Ninth Circuit reversed, stating 
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that the District Court failed to consider whether hugs, which included chest to breast contact, of 
that frequency could allow a reasonable juror to find a hostile work environment.162 The Ninth 
Circuit concluded that “giving the record proper consideration, a reasonable juror could conclude 
that the differences in hugging men and women were not, as the defendants argue, just ‘genuine 
but innocuous differences in the ways men and women routinely interact with members of the 
same sex and of the opposite sex.’”163 
Since determining the degree of severity or pervasiveness is primarily fact sensitive, many 
courts have, as illustrated above, denied hostile work environment claims on the theory that there 
is inadequate evidence to support a hostile work environment claim.164  Contrarily, other courts 
have decided that since “no bright line exist, these questions should be given to a jury so long as 
the district court judge is satisfied that the alleged conduct was made because of [the protected 
class].”165 In the next section, this note will illustrate why the latter is the better approach.  
 
 III ANALYSIS  
 Courts should be willing to acknowledge their own limitations in deciding whether a 
plaintiff’s allegations are sufficiently severe or pervasive. Many scholars and commentators have 
proposed that courts are inappropriately granting summary judgment motions on a consistent basis 
in the employment discrimination context.166 The plethora of scenarios in which discrimination 
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can exist in the work place renders daunting  the task of determining when a discriminatory 
incident is sufficiently severe or pervasive. Due to the many faces of discrimination, the Supreme 
Court was correct in stating that the determination of whether a hostile work environment exist 
cannot be reduced to a “mathematically precise test.”167 However, while a mathematically precise 
test may not be the answer, perhaps a different numbers game can help reduce the inconsistencies 
in these determinations. In this section I will propose that judges should limit their use of summary 
judgment in the hostile work environment context so that a more numerous and socially diverse 
jury can decide when the evidence a plaintiff alleges is sufficient to create a hostile work 
environment. While some may criticize this approach as being unworkable or an 
oversimplification of a highly complex problem, I contend that this is the better approach because 
juries, who have different life experiences, are, from a practical standpoint, better suited to identify 
discriminatory conduct that may seem neutral to one who is unfamiliar with the conduct’s meaning 
in a given context. 
 Although the Third Circuit’s decision in Castleberry v. STI Group to acknowledge the 
ability of one isolated incident to establish a hostile work environment is a step in the right 
direction, a judge’s inability to identify when these incidents are adequately “severe or pervasive” 
in effect nullifies any positive impact a decision like Castleberry can make. As the foregoing cases 
illustrate, there has been a great disparity in what judges consider “severe or pervasive.” Scholars 
have pointed to various causes for the granting of summary judgment in employment 
discrimination cases such as: 1) judges may believe that we live in a post-racial and post-sexist 
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society; 2) most  employment discrimination cases are viewed as frivolous claims; 3) the non-
frivolous claims may be taken to state court because state laws are more employee friendly; 4) The 
Supreme Court may have narrowed the law in a way that protects employers; 5) the managerial 
pressures on judges may create biases against these cases; 6) lack of diversity within the federal 
bench; and 7) courts often ignore the contextual realities of modern language and thus fail to 
recognize the employee discrimination.168Although the causes may seem multifaceted, at least four 
of the seven explanations  can be resolved by a judge’s deferral to a jury.  
 The Supreme Court has hinted at the fact that judges have been having problems analyzing 
the contextual impact of a defendant’s actions in the workplace.169 In Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., the 
Court addressed the ability of the word “boy” to carry racial implications.170 The Court vacated 
and remanded the Eleventh Circuit’s decision, stating that the Eleventh Circuit erred in holding 
that only when the use of the word boy is paired by a racial classification like “black” or “white” 
is evidence of discriminatory intent.171 The Supreme Court stated that, “[a]lthough it is true [the 
word boy] will not always be evidence of racial animus, it does not follow that the term, standing 
alone is always benign….[its] meaning may depend on various factors including context, 
                                                          
168 Nancy Gertner, The Judicial Repeal of the Johnson/Kennedy Administration’s “Signature” Achievement 
2-4 (Mar. 9, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (offering five potential causes as to why employment discrimination 
cases fare worse than other kinds of cases: 1) judges’ believe we live in a post racial and post sexist society; 2) 
many employment discrimination cases may be frivolous; 3) good cases are taken to state court because state laws 
are more employee friendly;4) the Supreme Court may have narrowed the law in ways that protect employers; 5) 
managerial pressures on judges may create biases against these cases); Theresa M. Beiner, The Misuse of Summary 
Judgment In Hostile Environment Cases, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 71, 119-120 (1999) (stating that the lack of diversity 
on the bench is one of the many reasons courts show increasing hostility to hostile environment claims); Leora F. 
Eisenstadt, The N-Word at Work: Contextualizing Language in the Workplace, 33 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 299, 320-
21 (2012) ( “courts tend to ignore the contextual realities of modern language use and even the historical meaning 
of words when evaluating the discriminatory implications of such language rings true throughout district and 
appellate court opinions.”).  
 
169 See generally Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454 (2006). 
170 Id. 
171 Id. at 456-458 
 26 
inflection, tone of voice, local custom, and historical usage.”172 While this statement leaves much 
to be desired, a closer look at the procedural history of Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., further illustrates 
judges’ issues with interpreting the contextual meaning of discriminatory conduct.  
 The Ash v. Tyson saga centers on allegations of race discrimination that took place in a 
Tyson Foods processing plant.173 At trial two plaintiffs, Anthony Ash and John Hithon, each 
brought promotion discrimination claims.174 The jury found for the plaintiffs and returned identical 
awards of compensatory and punitive damages for each.175 Subsequently, Tyson filed a motion for 
judgment as a matter of law contending that plaintiffs’ evidence was insufficient to sustain the 
jury’s findings that plaintiffs were the victims of promotion discrimination.176 Plaintiffs brought 
forward the use of discriminatory conduct by Tyson’s Manager, the one making the promotion 
decisions, as a way to refute the supposedly non-pretextual reason for the manager’s decision.177 
Among the evidence of this discriminatory conduct were incidents where the manager referred to 
both the plaintiffs, whom were African Americans, as “boy.”178 The district court stated that, even 
if the manager did make those statements, the word “boy” could not be found to be evince 
discriminatory bias without more.179 Ultimately, the district court agreed with Tyson and granted 
judgment in its favor as a matter of law.180 
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 Plaintiffs appealed the district court decision to the Eleventh Circuit.181 The Eleventh 
Circuit also addressed the manager’s use of the word “boy.”182 It also found that the use of the 
word “boy” standing alone is not evidence of discrimination.183 The court stated that, “while the 
use of ‘boy’ when modified by a racial classification like ‘black’ or ‘white’ is evidence of 
discriminatory intent, the use of ‘boy’ alone is not evidence of discrimination.”184  
 The Supreme Court granted review of the Eleventh Circuit’s decision as to whether the 
word “boy” was potentially probative of discriminatory animus and whether the plaintiffs’ claimed 
superior qualifications for the positions in question could potentially demonstrate that they were 
not hired for pretextual reasons.185 As to the use of the word “boy” by the Tyson manager, the 
Court stated  
[a]lthough it is true the disputed word will not always be evidence of racial animus, 
it does not follow that the term, standing alone, is always benign. The speaker’s 
meaning may depend on various factors including context, inflection, tone of voice, 
local custom, and historical usage.186  
While the Court did not delve into the historical context as to how the word “boy” was used to 
belittle black men, the Court’s message in this rather short statement is clear. It directed judges to 
look not only at the immediate context in which the word was used but also the word’s local custom 
and historical usage.187 Thus, the Court vacated the Eleventh Circuit’s decision and remanded the 
case for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court’s opinion.188  
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 The Eleventh Circuit, on remand, concluded once again that the use of the word “boy” did 
not provide a reasonable basis for a jury to conclude that Tyson’s reasons for not promoting the 
plaintiffs were based on racial discrimination.189 It characterized the use of the word “boy” as 
conversational and “even if somehow construed as racial, we conclude that the comments were 
ambiguous stray remarks… and are not sufficient circumstantial evidence of bias.”190 Thus, the 
Eleventh Circuit reinstated its prior decision, which affirmed the district court’s grant of judgment 
as a matter of law in favor of Tyson on Ash’s discrimination claims.191 As to Hithon, the court 
affirmed the district court’s order granting a new trial because there was insufficient evidence to 
support the jury’s punitive damages award, and the compensatory damages were deemed 
excessive.192 
 In the new trial proceedings, the district court bifurcated the case into liability and damages 
phases.193 After plaintiff presented his evidence at the liability phase, Tyson moved for judgment 
as a matter of law suggesting that plaintiff failed to present enough evidence of discrimination for 
his claim to go to a jury.194 The district court denied this motion and the jury returned a verdict 
against Tyson on Hithon’s discrimination claim, awarding him recovery totaling $335,000 in 
compensatory damages and $1,000,000 in punitive damages.195 The district court then denied 
Tyson’s renewed judgment as a matter of law as to the compensatory damages but granted the 
motion regarding the punitive damages. 196 
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 Unhappy with the district court’s decision, both parties appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.197 
Hithon appealed the court’s decisions to set aside the punitive damages and Tyson cross-appealed 
the court’s denial of their renewed motion as a matter of law. 198 The Eleventh Circuit again found 
that the use of the term “boy” was not enough to create a jury issue as to whether Tyson’s reason 
for not choosing the plaintiff for the promotion was pretextual. 199 The court found that, under the 
law of the case doctrine, it could review its decision only if new and substantially different 
evidence of the use of the word “boy” was presented at trial.200  Despite Hithon’s new testimony 
regarding how the word “boy” is comparable to the N-word given the historical context, the 
Eleventh Circuit found that this was not new or substantially different enough to revisit the 
conclusion.201 Ultimately, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and remanded 
for entry of judgment in favor of Tyson.202 
 Surprisingly, the Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., saga did not end with that decision.203 The 
Eleventh Circuit reversed itself in response to a petition for rehearing en banc by Hinthon. 204 
Although the Eleventh Circuit, in a prior opinion, stated that the evidence presented at the second 
trial was not “new and substantially different enough for us to revisit the conclusion of law[,]” the 
court  retracted this statement by saying “we now reach a different conclusion.” The Eleventh 
Circuit recognized that there was enough evidence in the record for a jury to find that Tyson 
discriminated against the plaintiff on the basis of his race and reversed itself.  
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 The procedural history of Ash v. Tyson, illustrates the problem judges have with 
recognizing how certain instances of conduct can be discriminatory. In analyzing this case, one 
may ask why it took the Eleventh Circuit four times to come to the right conclusion, which the 
jury made right away. This issue is not unique to Ash v. Tyson, and can be seen across many 
appellate level decisions. While scholars may debate on what the cause of phenomenon, it is worth 
noting that the jury reached the correct verdict twice within this series and thus, suggests that they 
may well be better than judges in consistently determining when a work environment is sufficiently 
severe or pervasive to sustain a hostile work environment claim.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
 Since the beginning of the use of the severe or pervasive standard in hostile work 
environment claims, judges have been rendered incapable of consistently determining when a 
hostile work environment is sufficiently severe or pervasive. While some judges are willing to 
acknowledge a question of fact when a plaintiff complains of being excessively hugged, other 
judges grant summary judgment in cases where a supervisor, someone in a position of control, 
uses racist remarks towards an employee.  Since judges cannot consistently measure the hostility 
of work environments, it is essential that judges defer to a jury when contemplating to grant 
summary judgment.  
  
  
  
 
